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Protecting Children: Explaining Disparities in the 
Female Offender's Pretrial Process, and Policy 
Issues Surrounding Lenient Treatment of Mothers 
Sean B. Berberian * 
INTRODUCTION 
[W]omen defendants ... appear to have received more lenient 
sentences, but we have not been able to determine whether the 
small differences observed relate just to gender, or instead reflect 
actual differences between men and women defendants, 
differences, for example, relating to [the] effect on children of 
incarceration .... 1 
Professor Vicki C. Jackson's remarks reflect an unanswered policy 
concern which continues to plague the criminal justice system. The 
dilemma demands new research and new explanations aimed at better 
understanding the judicial system's treatment of women. This Note will 
attempt to address this concern. Further, it will discuss the equally 
important questions of whether issues such as the presence of children 
should be taken into consideration by judges. 
For many years, academic discourse on women in the criminal justice 
system was neglected, due to the historically male demographics of prison 
populations.2 However, throughout the last twenty years there has been an 
increasing interest in women in the judicial process as a result of both the 
* The author is a 1999 graduate of the University of California, Hastings College of the 
Law. I would like to thank Dr. Vema Keith for her guidance through the early development 
of this Note, and Dr. Gary Rolison for his help in setting up the empirical model. I would 
also like to express my gratitude to Dr. Reuel Schiller and George Neil Parducho Valdes for 
their comments and editing. Finally, I would like to thank Stephanie Acuna for her never-
ending support. 
1. See 160 F.R.D. 169, 189 (1994). 
2. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 213 
(1993) (explaining that the relative lack of women in the criminal justice system has been 
consistent throughout United States history). 
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rising numbers of women in the criminal justice system3 and the growth in 
feminist jurisprudence. One issue that has received a great deal of attention 
is the analysis of gender differences in sentencing.4 Theories accounting 
for disparate treatment in the criminal justice system are split in opposing 
directions: harsher treatment of females, versus more lenient treatment of 
females. These theoretical categories reflect the historical trend of the 
courts. Past decisions suggest that women have historically been treated 
more harshly than men,5 while recent judicial decisions show that women 
are generally being treated with more leniency.6 These recent trends have 
created great interest, and in tum, an abundance of theories attempting to 
explain the apparent present-day lenient treatment of women. 
Growing interest in sentencing disparities by policy makers and 
academics culminated in the creation of the Sentencing Commission,7 and 
the passage of the United States Sentencing Guidelines in 1987.8 While 
race was arguably the greatest motivating factor in attempts to create a 
system of unbiased sentencing,9 gender disparities were also a large 
concern.1O Policy makers recognized the apparent lenient treatment of 
3. The percentage of women among all convicted offenders in u.s. District Courts was 
7% in 1963, 10.8% in 1979 and 16.4% in 1992. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
FEDERAL OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 1963, at 10 (1964); ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL OFFENDERS IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 
1979, at 75 (1980); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, ANNUAL REp., Table 13 (1992). Also note 
that there have been various attempts to explain the relatively recent increase of women in 
the criminal justice system, but most are based on theories of men being the center and 
women being part of the periphery. See, e.g., FREDA ADLER, SISTERS IN CRIME (1975) 
(arguing that increase in female crime is a result of women becoming more like men, from 
factors such as women's liberation). See also KATHLEEN DALY, GENDER, CRIME, AND 
PUNISHMENT 11 (1994) (criticizing many studies which compare men and women, arguing 
that by simply "comparing women to men, a male standard is left intact") [hereinafter 
DALY, GENDER, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT]. 
4. See, e.g., Candace Kruttschnitt, Women, Crime and Dependency: An Application of 
the Theory of Law, 19 CRIMINOWGY 495 (1982) [hereinafter Kruttschnitt, Women, Crime 
and Dependency]; Kathleen Daly, Structure and Practice of Familial-Based Justice in a 
Criminal Court, 21 L. & SOC'Y REv. 267 (1987) [hereinafter Daly, Structure and Practice]; 
Gayle S. Bickle & Ruth D. Peterson, The Impact of Gender-Based Family Roles on 
Criminal Sentencing, 38 Soc. PROBS. 372 (1991). . 
5. See, e.g., Robert Terry, The Screening of Juvenile Offenders, 58 J. CRIM. L. 
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 173 (1967) (stating that when women committed crimes, they 
broke moral standards and received harsher punishment); David R. Johnson & Laurie K. 
Scheuble, Gender Bias in the Disposition of Juvenile Court Referrals: The Effects of Time 
and Location, 29 CRIMINOWGY 677 (1991) (demonstrating that women's traditional roles 
were strictly enforced and if women deviated from them, they were stringently punished). 
6. See generally note 4, supra. 
7. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (codified at 18 U.S.c. §§ 3553, 3661 (1994) and 
28 U.S.c. §§ 991, 994 (1994» (acts which set forth the Commission's goals and 
limi tati ons ). 
8. See U. S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1997) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. 
9. See DALY, GENDER, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 3, at 5 (arguing that it was 
the "compelling stories of racial disparity that spawned the sentencing reform movement ... 
. "). 
10. See Ilene H. Nagel & Barry L. Johnson, The Role of Gender in a Structured 
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female offenders and instituted the gender-neutral guidelines. 1 1 However, 
while gender-neutral sentencing in theory may seem to be a rational goal, it 
•. ., . 12 
creates IllJuStIce III practIce. 
In hindsight, it is apparent that policy makers were acting on a largely 
underdeveloped area of research. 13 Early studies on modem gender 
disparities in the criminal justice system showed more lenient treatment for 
women, but did not convincingly explain why women seemed to be treated 
more leniently.I4 In response, sentencing guidelines were created which 
restricted the consideration of gender and also largely restricted the 
consideration of the family life and responsibilities of the defendant-most 
importantly, their children. 15 
Previous studies have established the lenient treatment of women in the 
judicial process. This Note looks to expand on that research by examining 
the reasons for the variation in the decision-making process. Different 
areas in the judicial process can be tested; this study examines the pretrial 
period. This Note will determine which groups of women are more likely 
to attain a pretrial release and from those women, who receives lower 
Sentencing System: Equal Treatment, Policy Choices, and the Sentencing of Female 
Offenders Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
181, 182 (noting the "significant efforts" made at both federal and state levels to refonn 
sentencing disparities in race, gender and class). 
11. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at § 5H1.1O (policy statement of guidelines). 
12. In part II of this note, I will address various problems surrounding the current 
guidelines. A number of authors have criticized the Commission for ignoring the gendered 
role of crime. See, e.g., DALY, GENDER, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 3, at 7; 
Myrna S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered Women, and Other Sex-
Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 20 PEPP. 
L. REv. 905, 977-79 (1993) (explaining the gendered role of women in conspiracies and 
how that should affect severity of their punishment). 
13. Research in the late 1970s and early 1980s tended to explain gender disparities as a 
result of paternalism and chivalry, therefore leading many to believe that the' lenient 
treatment many women received was based solely on being female and therefore 
unwarranted. See, e.g., ELIZABETH F. MOULDS, CHIVALRY AND PATERNALISM: DISPARITIES 
OF TREATMENT IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 277-99 (Susan K. Datesman & Frank R. 
Scarpitti eds., 1980); Christy A. Visher, Gender, Police Arrest Decisions, and Notions of 
Chivalry, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 5 (1983). 
14. See Kathleen Daly, Rethinking Judicial Paternalism: Gender, Work-Family 
Relations, and Sentencing, 3 GENDER & SOC'Y 9, 11 (1989) (Daly suggests "the need to be 
more precise in identifying the objects of judicial protection") [hereinafter Daly, Rethinking 
Judicial Paternalism]. More advanced theories on gender disparities were being developed 
in the early 1980s, but it is not clear if members of the Federal Sentencing Commission 
were interested in the reasons for disparity. See generally RITA SIMON, WOMEN AND CRIME 
(1975) (purporting that leniency is a result of the impracticality of sending women who have 
children to prison, because of the impact on family). Seemingly ignoring these types of 
studies, the Commission sought only to eliminate the disparity. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., 
The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. 
REv. 1938 (1988) (stating that guidelines were created to increase uniformity and 
proportionality in sentencing by controlling judicial discretion). 
15. See 28 U.S.c. § 994(e) (1997) (Congress directed Sentencing Commission to not 
ordinarily consider offenders' family responsibilities). 
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baillbond amounts. More specifically, this Note will explore the 
demographic and contextual characteristics of those who are more likely to 
receive a pretrial release, and which characteristics affect their baillbond 
amount. These analyses will allow for a clearer understanding and more 
accurate application of the competing theories on why the variations in 
leniency exist. Furthermore, this will help to answer the far-reaching 
question of why women, as an aggregate, are treated with more leniency. 
Resolving the question of why certain women are treated with more 
leniency lends itself to answering the question of whether this special 
treatment is proper. 
Nonetheless, the goal of this Note is not to simply examine whether 
courts treat men and women differently. The purpose of this empirical 
study is to test whether courts concern themselves with protecting the 
children of female offenders, and whether they act on these concerns by 
giving women with children more lenient treatment. Additionally, this 
Note argues that as a matter of policy, courts should be allowed to consider 
the presence of innocent children beyond what federal sentencing 
guidelines currently permit. 
Part I of this Note is dedicated to an empirical analysis of how extra-
legal factors affect women's treatment in the judicial system. Part II will 
question whether extra-legal factors-such as parenthood-should be taken 
into consideration when judicial decisions are made. The empirical 
analysis indicates that the courts do take extra-legal factors--especially 
parenthood-into consideration. The conclusion of this Note demonstrates 
that simply denouncing gender disparities and blindly setting gender-
neutral policies ignores gendered roles in society. This results in harming 
both mothers and their innocent children by often treating women more 
harshly. Ultimately, judges must consider the familial responsibilities of 
defendants. Both federal and state sentencing guidelines must be amended 
to allow for regular consideration of these familial circumstances of 
offenders. 
PART I: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
All areas of the judicial system are relevant in assessing gender 
discrimination. 16 Areas of the process which have been tested include: 
sentencing severity;17 police arrest decisions;18 pretrial release decisions;19 
16. See generally DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW (1976) (espousing 
macrotheoretical propositions which are pertinent in all areas of the law); see also Candace 
Kruttschnitt, Social Status and Sentences of Female Offenders, 15 L. & SOC'Y REVIEW 247, 
249 (1980-81) [hereinafter Kruttschnitt, Social Status & Sentences] (stating that "all aspects 
of legal life" can be used to test theories on disparities in the legal system). 
17. See e.g., Daly, Structure and Practice, supra note 4; Bickle & Peterson, supra note 4. 
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probation officer sentencing recommendations;20 and convictions?! In this 
study, like many others, the interest is in the determinants of being 
incarcerated versus not being incarcerated, as well as the cost of non-
incarceration. Here, pretrial release decisions will be used to investigate 
the effects of extra-legal factors on the judicial decision-making process. 
Sex role traditionalism,22 as well as an unconventional application of 
paternalism,23 are two theories that attempt to explain the harsher treatment 
of females in the criminal justice system. However, there is an abundance 
of theories attempting to explain the lenient treatment of women, and the 
theory of paternalism is only a beginning point for most of them.24 In fact, 
the majority of theories on women in the criminal justice system are 
attempts to explain the lenient treatment of women. Clearly, this is due to 
the consistency of findings that show a trend in lenient treatment for 
women.
25 
1. Harsher Treatment of Women 
The theory of sex-role traditionalism26 argues that women are subjected 
to harsher treatment than men are in the judicial system. More specifically, 
the theory suggests that illegal behavior by women is seen as unsuitable 
because it is in direct conflict with the traditional role of women in 
society.27 Where the male's traditional role normally includes occasional 
18. See Visher, supra note 13. 
19. See Sean Berberian & Garry L. Rolison, The Relevance of Paternalism in Pretrial 
Adjudication Among Incarcerated African American Women, 3 AFR. AM. REs. PERSP. 50 
(1997); Kathleen Daly, Neither Conflict Nor Labeling Nor Paternalism Will Suffice: 
Intersections of Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Family in Criminal Court Decisions, 35 
CRIME & DELINQ. 136 (1989) [hereinafter Daly, Neither Conflict Nor Labeling Nor 
Paternalism Will Suffice]. 
20. See Candace Kruttschnitt, Legal Outcomes and Legal Agents: Adding Another 
Dimension to the Sex-Sentencing Controversy, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 287 (1985) 
[hereinafter Kruttschnitt, Legal Outcomes and Legal Agents]. 
21. See ILENE H. BERNSTEIN, ET AL., DEFENDANT'S SEX AND CRIMINAL COURT DECISIONS, 
in DISCRIMINATION IN ORGANIZATIONS 329-54 (Rudolfo Alvarez & Kenneth G. Lutterman 
eds., 1979). 
22. See SIMON, supra note 14, at 52. 
23. As will be explained, paternalism usually produces lenient treatment of women out of 
a desire to protect them. 
24. Section II will provide an overview of past studies and explanations for the lenient 
treatment of women. As will be discussed, many early studies attempted to explain lenient 
treatment as a result of chivalrous and paternalistic treatment from judges; however, these 
theories did not fully explain the gender discrepancies nor the discrepancies between 
seemingly similarly situated women. 
25. The number of studies that indicate the lenient treatment of women is too long to list; 
I refer the reader to the studies cited throughout section II. 
26. See generally SIMON, supra note 14; see also Clarice Feinman, Sex Role Stereotypes 
and Justice for Women, 25 CRIME & DELINQ. 87 (1979); Anne Edwards, Sex/Gender, 
Sexism and Criminal Justice: Some Theoretical Considerations, 17 INT'L J. Soc. L. 165 
(1989) (both Feinman and Edwards espouse the theory of the traditional sex role model as 
an explanation for the more punitive treatment of women). 
27. See generally SIMON, supra note 14. 
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infractions of the law, females are supposed to be "dependent, gentle, and 
compliant.,,28 Since criminal actions by women breach their traditional 
role, according to this theory, they will be punished more severely.29 A 
number of studies indicate that throughout American judicial history, 
women have generally received harsher treatment by the courts?O 
However, in the last thirty years, harsher treatment of women in sentencing 
has only been seen in exceptional cases. Therefore, the sex-role 
traditionalism model has only limited application in these current judicial 
decision-making trends. However, in other specific time periods, regions 
and types of dispositions women have been more likely to receive harsher 
penalties than men. Examples illustrating this trend include studies by 
sociologists Robert Terry31 and Linda Hancock,32 where juvenile females 
who committed crimes that offended traditional moral standards received 
harsher sanctions then juvenile males. Meda Chesney-Lind also confrrms 
this position, reporting that girls were more likely to be referred for status 
offenses than boys?3 
Studies analyzing specific historical periods have also shown support 
for sex-role traditionalism.34 Sociologist Helen Boritch states that, "[ w ]hile 
much of the contemporary sentencing research has sought to explain (and 
sometimes, qualify) the predominant pattern of leniency toward female 
offenders, the historical evidence suggests that the opposite pattern of 
gender discrimination prevailed (quite often) in the past.,,35 Boritch 
analyzed sentencing during the Urban Reform Era (1871-1920) in Canada, 
which coincided with the Progressive Era in the United States, and the 
findings showed that women in general received harsher sanctions than 
28. David R. Johnson & Laurie K. Scheuble, Gender Bias in the Disposition of Juvenile 
Court Referrals: The Effects of Time and Location, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 677, 678 (1991). 
Sex-role traditionalism explains that men are not treated as severely because often when a 
man breaks the law, it is viewed as "a consequence of independence, aggressiveness, and 
self-reliance, which are strong components of the traditional male role." [d. at 678. In other 
words, society expects men to break the law as an expression of their maleness, while 
women are expected to remain docile and obedient. See id. 
29. See id. 
30. See, e.g., Helen Boritch, Gender and Criminal Court Outcomes: An Historical 
Analysis, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 293 (1992). 
31. See Terry, supra note 5 (in a sample of juveniles taken out of the Midwest, there was 
a significant relationship between gender and sentencing, girls being treated more harshly 
than boys). 
32. See Linda Hancock, The Myth That Females are Treated More Leniently than Males 
in the Juvenile System, 16 AUST. & N. Z. J. Soc. 4 (1980) (in a sample taken from Victoria, 
Hancock found girls were more likely to receive probation while boys were more likely to 
receive dismissals, adjournments, or fines). 
33. See Meda Chesney-Lind, Judicial Paternalism and the Female Status Offender: 
Training Women to Know Their Place, 23 CRIME & DELINQ. 121 (1977) (showing harsher 
treatment of girls; illustrating both greater likelihood of being charged with a status crime 
and more severe sentencing for that crime). 
34. See Boritch, supra note 30, at 312, 316. 
35. [d. at 316. 
& " 
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men.
36 Some of the most significant gender differences were in the areas of 
public disorder offenses and vagrancy (which was specifically used to 
charge prostitutes).37 As will become clear below, studies on present day 
judicial decisions indicate leniency-as opposed to historical studies, 
which indicate harsher treatment of women.38 For this and future studies, it 
is important to note the changing boundaries that have been forced upon 
women throughout history, and that these social norms continue to affect 
. 39 
sentencmg. 
Another explanation for the harsher treatment of women is an 
unconventional application of the theory of paternalism. A conventional 
application of paternalism would result in women receiving more lenient 
treatment out of a desire to protect women. However, Chesney-Lind 
demonstrates that it can function in the opposite manner as well. In a study 
of young women and men, Chesney-Lind found that women were treated 
more severely than men.40 She argued that judicial paternalism results in 
higher rates of detention for young women than young men because of the 
court's belief that women need more guidance and contro1.41 2. Lenient 
Treatment of Women 
a. Paternalism Generally 
Paternalism has traditionally been used as the theoretical basis for 
explaining the lenient treatment of women. It is necessary to define 
paternalism because certain definitions in the past have wrongly equated 
leniency with paternalism.42 Paternalism may plausibly cause leniency, but 
not all leniency is a product of paternalism. Furthermore, paternalism can 
potentially result in harsher treatment for women. Female Paternalism, 
where a distinction is made between chivalry and paternalism, is the 
"power [relationship] reflecting women's social and legal inferiority to 
men because of their putative need to be supported, guided, and 
36. See id. at 303,316-19. 
37. See id. at 316-17. 
38. Boritch discusses the apparent reasons for the historically harsher treatment of 
women, concluding that they are a result of gender- and class-based stereotypes and 
structural factors. See id. at 318-19. More specifically, courts viewed the men's position in 
the family as more important because men are the "providers"; courts seemed to take into 
consideration the lack of state support for families and therefore determined that 
incarcerating the male provider would be more detrimental than incarcerating the woman 
who was viewed as the caretaker. See id. at 319. Therefore, the result in this period often 
was harsher treatment of women than men. Furthermore, class-based stereotypes played a 
part in the decision-making process, in that most women before the court were working-
class women and working was an indication they were inadequate mothers because their 
place was supposed to be in the home. See id. 
39. [d. at 320. 
40. See Chesney-Lind, supra note 33, at 124. 
41. See id. 
42. See Daly, Rethinking Judicial Paternalism, supra note 14, at 10. 
hj[-
M.M 
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protected.',43 Definitions which make no distinction between chivalry and 
paternalism, "define female paternalism as chivalrous attitudes and 
behaviors that reflect a degree of respect toward women.,,44 However, 
some scholars have shown the latter definition to be problematic, because 
paternalism is not applied to all women; it is only applied to those who fit 
into the traditional sex-role.45 Furthermore, paternalism might only benefit 
white and middle-class women.46 
Although all of these distinctions in paternalism are important, the 
basic theory of paternalism is of marginal use here because it has not 
consistently nor uniformly explained the differentiation in recent judicial 
decision-making trends.47 One of the first expansions of paternalism was 
the practicality theory, which noted the importance of gender-based family 
roles in judicial sentencing.48 This theory explained that the court believes 
that it is impractical to incarcerate a mother out of concern for the welfare 
of the children.49 
Despite the apparent judicial concern for families, the question remains 
whether the courts are protecting children or protecting familial labor. 50 
As historical studies indicate, the courts have had little trouble deciding to 
incarcerate mothers in previous periods.51 Therefore, the practicality 
theory is applicable when women are treated with leniency, but, as in the 
Urban Reform Era, when women were treated more harshly, the courts 
seemed to believe that it was practical to jail women with children.52 
Notwithstanding the fact that women were completely responsible for 
taking care of the children in that era, it seems that the court believed that 
economic support from the father was more important than childcare from 
the mother.53 In the early 1900s, a second parent was almost always 
present to support the children-therefore, the loss of the mother was not 
completely devastating. However, today the prevalence of one-parent 
households--especially single mother households-forces courts to face 
the grim reality that there might not be anyone to take care of the children 
43. [d. at 10 (citing MOULDS, supra note 13, at 279-82). 
44. See Daly, Rethinking Judicial Paternalism, supra note 14, at 10 (citing Dene H. 
Nagel & John Hagan, Gender and Crime: Offense Patterns and Criminal Court Sanctions, 
in CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris 
eds., 1983». 
45. See Visher, supra note 13, at 6. 
46. See Dorie Klein, The Etiology of Female Crime: A Review of the Literature, 8 ISSUES 
IN CRIMINOLOGY 3 (1973). 
47. See, e.g., Daly, Rethinking Judicial Paternalism, supra note 14, at 11 (pointing out a 
need to "be more precise in identifying the objects of judicial protection"). 
48. See Simon, supra note 14, at 49. 
49. See id. 
50. See Daly, Rethinking Judicial Paternalism, supra note 14, at 11. 
51. See generally Boritch, supra note 30 (study showing that women received more 
severe sentences than men in a sample over the late 19th Century to early 20th Century). 
52. See id. 
53. Seeid.at319. 
1 '1 E HW* Ed 
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if the mother is incarcerated.54 
In an attempt to explain specific circumstances where the practicality 
theory fails, some scholars have employed an economic-based theory of 
leniency.55 The Functional Theory of Deviant Type-Scripts operates on the 
idea that white "men have an [economic] interest in maintaining women's 
familial labor in the home.,,56 It follows that, if women were continually 
imprisoned, the continuance of white male hegemony would also be 
threatened, because the unpaid familial labor performed by females would 
be eliminated. 57 Therefore, the lenient treatment of females reflects the 
interest of men in keeping women in the home to perform free labor.58 
b. Informal Social Control 
Candace Kruttschnitt posits a theory of informal social control to 
explain gender disparities in sentencing. 59 She finds two main sources of 
informal social control for women: economic dependency (on a spouse or 
the state), and the high levels of "supervisory activity associated with 
women's residing with others.,,60 Kruttschnitt argues that lenient 
sanctioning trends for women reflect their high degree of informal social 
control stemming from family and work ties. 61 Her theory predicts that the 
degree of informal social control placed on a person is related inversely to 
the amount of formal (state) control placed on that person.62 
In one study, Kruttschnitt used probation officer sentence 
recommendations to identify a variety of infractions.63 When using a 
composite measure of dependency64 as her main independent variable, the 
54. The courts' protection of children will be further discussed in the section on familial 
paternalism. 
55. See Anthony R. Harris, Sex and Theories of Deviance: Toward a Functional Theory 
of Deviant Type-Scripts, 42 AM. Soc. REv. 3 (1977). 
56. Daly, Structure and Practice, supra note 4, at 270 (referring to Harris' theory). 
57. See Harris, supra note 55, at 13. 
58. See id. Furthermore, this theory argues that non-white women will not receive 
lenient treatment, because they "are not essential to the maintenance of white male 
hegemony." [d. 
59. See Kruttschnitt, Social Status and Sentences, supra note 16, at 247. 
60. Bickle & Peterson, supra note 4, at 373 (explaining the elements of Kruttschnitt's use 
of informal social control theory). 
61. See Kruttschnitt, Social Status and Sentences, supra note 16, at 259,262. The theory 
of informal social control builds upon Black's theory of law, especially concerning social 
status and the law. See id. at 249 (citing BLACK, supra note 16). 
62. See Kruttschnitt, Social Status and Sentences, supra note 16, at 259,262. 
63. See generally id. See also Kruttschnitt, Women, Crime and Dependency, supra note 
4 (both publications covered the same data set, with the first analyzing actual sentencing 
and the second looking at probation officer recommendations). The crimes analyzed within 
the sample were disturbing the peace, assault, forgery, drug law violations and petty theft. 
See id. 
64. The composite measure of dependency is a combination of independent variables. 
Here the composite measure of dependency was constructed with a cross-tabulating source 
of economic support, marital status and whether or not the defendant lives with her husband 
or child. See Kruttschnitt, Women, Crime and Dependency, supra note 4. 
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data showed that this variable significantly affected sentencing severity for 
women convicted of petty theft and forgery, but not for those convicted of 
disturbing the peace, assault and drug violations.65 When changing her 
main independent variable to a source of support indicator, the variable was 
significant for sentencing severity in all offense types, except for drug 
violations.66 The results of further studies67 testing this theory were 
somewhat complicated because different measures of social control were 
used.68 The most notable result of her group of studies is that the 
individual-based measures of informal social control (source of support and 
household composition) confrrm the predicted relationship with the chance 
of a pretrial release, but not necessarily with her sentencing model. In 
general, the research shows more limited support for the theory. 69 When 
testing this theory, it is important to use a wide range of measures of social 
control: employment, children, age, income and marital status. 
While Kruttschnitt's studies are informative, there are problems with 
the analyses. Daly stresses that "two flaws are apparent: the locus of 
informal social control is misspecified, and gender differences in court 
outcomes cannot be adequately explained by it.,,70 The misspecification to 
which Daly refers is Kruttschnitt's use of economic dependency of women 
on men. Daly purports that the locus should be whether or not women have 
dependent children.71 This criticism represents the main distinction 
between Kruttschnitt and Daly's theories. Daly's criticism is probably 
justified, because Kruttschnitt's definition of the theory relies on the 
dependence of women on men. Today, this dependence is disappearing, 
and expanding the scope of informal social control seems warranted. The 
locus of economic dependency can be widened to the dependency on a 
source of income, which includes employment. However, the informal 
social control placed on a person from a family remains the other important 
part of this theory. 
Here it should also be noted that Kruttschnitt does not thoroughly 
65. See generally id. 
66. See generally id. 
67. See Candace Kruttschnitt, Sex and Criminal Court Dispositions: The Unresolved 
Controversy, 21 REs. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 213 (1984) [hereinafter Kruttschnitt, Sex and 
Criminal Court Dispositions]; Kruttschnitt, Legal Outcomes and Legal Agents, supra note 
20 (in these studies, as well as in others not cited herein, Kruttschnitt further examined 
gender disparities in pretrial releases and sentencing). 
68. She has measured social control with: a composite measure (which was used above), 
children; family composition; employment status; and source of support. See Bickle & 
Peterson, supra note 4, at 374. 
69. See id. Bickle and Peterson question the value of Kruttschnitt's findings, because of 
their "sporadic rather than consistent support for her hypotheses." Id. 
70. See Kathleen Daly, Discrimination in the Criminal Courts: Family, Gender, and the 
Problem of Equal Treatment, 66 Soc. FORCES 152, 154 (1987) [hereinafter Daly, 
Discrimination in the Criminal Courts]. 
71. See id. 
ide Me CAB 
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analyze discrepancies in the data for racial factors, which could have 
significance in sentencing.72 However, most statistical sentencing studies 
show that gender differences favoring women are more frequently found 
than race differences favoring white offenders.73 
c. Familial Paternalism 
Kathleen Daly offers an alternative to Kruttschnitt's informal social 
control model. Daly distinguishes between the judiciary's concern for 
protecting women (female paternalism) and the desire to protect children 
and families (familial paternalism).74 Through qualitative analyses, she 
finds that the court distinguishes between familied and nonfamilied 
defendants, with familied defendants receiving greater leniency.75 Daly's 
theory combines a narrow version of informal social control and 
practicality theory. In general terms, Daly finds that courts see familied 
defendants as more re~onsible and 'anchored' because they have people 
dependent upon them.7 She suggests that courts realize the impracticality 
of imprisoning a person on whom people depend, because it not only 
punishes the defendant but also the defendant's children.77 Hence, Daly 
argues the gender differentiation in judicial decisions derives from the 
72. See Daly, Neither Conflict nor Labeling nor Paternalism Will Suffice, supra note 19, 
at 141 (pointing out that different measures or controls can create different results from the 
same data set). 
73. See id. at 140-42. This points to a critical issue in the study of how race affects 
judicial decisions. Race has historically played a large part in judicial decisions; however 
in recent empirical studies, only capital punishment studies have data that consistently 
shows that racial effects are substantial. See J. Hagan & K. Bumiller, Making Sense of 
Sentencing: A Review and Critique of Sentencing Research, in 2 REsEARCH ON SENTENCING: 
THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 31-32 (A. Blumstein et al. eds., 1983) (noting that while black 
women comprise a large portion of arrests and half of all incarcerated women, racial 
disparities are not detectable in judicial decision making); cf McCkleskey v. Kemp, 481 
U.S. 279 (1987) (citing David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An 
Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983) 
(study on capital punishment, showing that defendants convicted of killing white victims 
were 4.3 times as likely to receive the death penalty as defendants convicted of killing black 
victims; it is an illustration of one of the few areas where racial disparities have been 
consistently proven empirically)). However, this is not to say that stereotypes and racism do 
not continue to play a significant role in many areas of the judicial process. As Kathleen 
Daly points out, quantitative studies may not be accurately measuring racial differences, 
because as is seen when legal scholars have focused on individual cases, racial differences 
are present. See DALY, GENDER, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 3, at 5. This issue 
will be further reviewed in section D, subsection 3 below. 
74. See Daly, Neither Conflict nor Labeling nor Paternalism Will Suffice, supra note 19, 
at 138. 
75. See Daly, Discrimination in the Criminal Courts, supra note 70, at 168. Not only do 
familied defendants receive more lenient treatment, but familied women receive more 
lenient treatment than familied men. See id. This seems to be a result of the court's belief 
that women with children playa larger role in care-taking than do the men. See id. 
76. See Daly, Neither Conflict nor Labeling nor Paternalism Will Suffice, supra note 19, 
at 138. 
77. See id. 
;; 
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judiciary's belief that it is more costly to jail women with families than 
men with families. 78 
Daly has performed extensive qualitative studies79 that test and confirm 
the familial paternalism theory, but has only one quantitative study.8o In 
Daly's quantitative study, racial variation is also examined.81 In short, just 
as Kruttschnitt's studies had discrepancies in the data on race, Daly's 
research also resulted in inconsistent findings. 82 It is important to keep in 
mind that, as Daly notes, "[v ]arying sample sizes and different measures or 
controls can produce significant or negligible race effects from the same 
data set. ,,83 
Bickle and Peterson, building on Daly's and Kruttschnitt's theories, use 
"a more comprehensive set of role factors" than either Daly or Kruttschnitt 
used respectively in the past. 84 Bickle and Peterson test whether effects of 
family roles vary by sex or race.85 In a sample of federal forgery 
offenders ,86 they found-with some qualifications-that family roles 
influence sentencing by increasing leniency for males and resulting in even 
greater leniency for females. 87 In addition, the impact of family role factors 
78. See Daly, Discrimination in the Criminal Courts, supra note 70, at 168. 
79. See, e.g., id. This study looked to four court decisions made in typical cases-pretrial 
release, dismissal, type of conviction and sentencing-and using observational studies and 
interviews with court officials, Daly found that both men and women who had children 
received lenient treatment, but with women receiving more leniency than men. [d. Other 
studies consisting of interviews with court officials have found that familied defendants 
received more leniency. See, e.g., Daly, Structure and Practice, supra note 4; Daly, 
Rethinking Judicial Paternalism, supra note 14. 
80. See Daly, Neither Conflict nor Labeling nor Paternalism Will Suffice, supra note 19. 
It should be acknowledged here that Daly's studies do have limitations. As Daly has 
criticized Kruttschnitt for using an incorrect locus of informal control, Daly's studies can be 
criticized for excluding measures of economic dependence. My statistical model analyzes 
both economic and familial variables. 
81. See id. 
82. See id. at 158~1 (pointing to possible statistical deficiencies, as well as inherent 
problems in understanding and testing "multiple influences of gender, race or ethnicity, 
class, and family in the criminal court"). 
83. [d. at 141. Daly has also formulated another point of attack in analyzing sentencing 
disparities. See DALY, GENDER, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 3, at 5-12 (suggesting 
that there is actually very little gender disparity in treatment by the courts, but that apparent 
lenient treatment of women is actually a result of different crimes and biographies of 
women). This issue will be more thoroughly discussed in the methods section below. 
84. Bickle & Peterson, supra note 4 (testing both familial paternalism and informal social 
control theories in order to determine what the courts actually look to in determining who is 
deserving of lenient treatment). 
85. See id. at 377. 
86. Their sample included 124 female and 390 male defendants convicted of forgery in 
federal district courts from 1973 to 1978. See id. 
87. See id. at 388-90. They found general support for both familial paternalism and 
informal social control. The data showed the importance of marital status, the presence of 
dependents, care-taking and living arrangements. See id. at 390. However, the variables for 
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do vary by the race of the defendant.88 The results of this study can only be 
taken as marginal, because of its small sample size and narrow population 
focus. However, this study's comprehensive set of family role factors-a 
combination of social control and familial paternalism-is an important 
starting point. 
d. Statement of the Problem 
This study is relevant because of increased female criminalization, the 
rising number of single mother households and continued concern about 
fair judicial decision making. There are two main goals that I would like to 
accomplish with this study. First, I would like to assess the competency of 
the two competing theories: familial paternalism and informal social 
control. While familial paternalism views having children as the major 
factor in explaining these variations in the judicial process, informal social 
control points to economic dependency and general family restraints. 
Second, I would like to strengthen the validity of findings on variations in 
judicial decision-making by using a nation-wide data set. 
This Note poses the question: Can we separate the importance of these 
two theories, as well as the variables that they use to predict judicial 
decisions? The conclusion is, "No"; it would be too exclusive of seemingly 
important factors. Together, the two theories encompass a comprehensive 
set of variables which this Note predicts will affect the likelihood of 
pretrial release and the bail/bond amount. The following predictions are 
made. A high degree of informal social control-through economic 
dependency and responsibility in the form of a job, marriage and/or 
children-will be found significant and will increase the chance of a 
pretrial release, as well as decrease the bail/bond amount. Also, as 
predicted by informal social control, the following variables will be 
significant: age, education level completed prior to imprisonment, and total 
income in year preceding imprisonment. At the same time, familial 
paternalism, having children89 and to a lesser extent being married, will be 
found significant, and the presence of children, and/or being married, will 
increase the probability of pretrial release and decrease the bail/bond 
amount. 
88. See id. at 390. Black women received more lenient treatment for providing 
significant emotional support to dependents, while white women did not. However, white 
women received lenient treatment merely for having emotional dependents, while black 
women did not. See id. As Bickle and Peterson discuss, there are a number of possible 
explanations for these differences, but it is clear that they are a result of different judicial 
assumptions about black versus white mothers. See id. at 391. 
89. Both familial paternalism and infonnal social control models predict that having 
children will create more lenient treatment, but each for different reasons. Familial 
paternalism theorizes that courts want to protect defendants' innocent children. On the other 
hand, infonnal social control theorizes that courts view having children as an indicator of 
defendants being grounded and less likely to be a recidivist because of the responsibility of 
taking care of children. 
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Note that marriage is a part of both theories. Informal social control 
views marriage as a factor that places more control on women, and also 
indicates that women have a higher level of dependency and responsibility. 
Familial paternalism views marriage as a part of the family responsibility, 
therefore arguing that it would be impractical to incarcerate the 
defendant. 90 Based on indications from prior studies, being African 
American, Latina,91 or residing in the South will probably decrease or 
eliminate the leniency that the two theories predict. 
B. METHODS92 
In this study, 14,649 cases were analyzed from the Survey of Inmates 
of State Correctional Facilities.93 This data set is the only resource 
available on a national basis. It allows for greater generalization to the 
U.S. population, which has never before been possible.94 The data set was 
reduced to include only women, and after more cases were dropped due to 
90. Marriage is a much less important variable in the familial paternalism model, because 
the theory is based on the idea that courts will protect the children, but not necessarily the 
entire family. In fact, it is quite possible that being married would create a lesser chance of 
leniency when there are children present, because then there would potentially be another 
parent to care for the children. 
91. The word Latino/a will be used instead of Hispanic herein. While the two are 
generally used synonymously, Latino/a is more self-defining-i.e., chosen by Spanish 
speaking people within the U.S.-and it comes from the word latinoamericanos. See ILAN 
STAVANS, THE HISPANIC CONDITION: REFLECTIONS ON CULTURE AND IDENTITY IN AMERICA 
25 (1995). Hispanic, on the other hand, is a word used by the media and government and is 
generally preferred by conservatives. See id. at 25-27 (giving a brief history of the names 
used, and even the fallacy of the correctness of the label "Latin America"). 
92. Before the methods of the study are explained, it is necessary to comment on the use 
of a quantitative model, as opposed to a qualitative-case-by-case analysis. While empirical 
research is invaluable to the study of law, there is great debate on which types of research 
are more valuablelreliable-qualitative or quantitative. The result of this debate is probably 
that both methods are necessary to tell policy makers and scholars different things. 
Statistical models can tell us general trends of the courts, and qualitative studies can help 
explain the processes/rationales that lead to those outcomes. See Daly, Neither Conflict nor 
Labeling nor Paternalism Will Suffice, supra note 19, at 137. What is also learned from this 
debate is that the way data is collected is very important. Additionally, while it is very 
difficult for quantitative studies to take into account the small, yet important, differences 
between the crimes of men and women who are convicted of the same crimes, they still 
allow us to determine if there are significant effects from certain factors, such as 
parenthood. 
93. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, No. 8711, SURVEY OF 
INMATES OF STATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 1986 (1988). The data were collected from 
275 facilities in face-to-face surveys. The data utilized in this study were made available in 
part by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The data for the 
Survey of Inmates of State Correctional Facilities, 1986 were originally collected by the 
Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Neither the collector of the 
original data nor the consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations 
presented here. 
94. The shortcoming of this data set is that it is not sufficiently thorough, like those that 
are found in local data sets, especially in qualitative studies. The advantage is that it is a 
national data set. Ultimately, you must lose specificity to gain wider applicability. 
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missing data, there were between 638 and 888 subjects-depending on 
which analysis was used.95 
Many of the variables chosen for the model were picked out of 
common sense predictions for which extra-legal factors may have an effect 
on severity. Others were chosen following other analogous studies, which 
tested them and found them significant. 96 
The independent variables fall into three categories: legally prescribed 
variables, extra-legal offender characteristics and contextual factors. As for 
the legally prescribed variables, the model is divided into two, by offense 
type (with sections of violent and property offenders). It was divided into 
two offense severities for two reasons: first, to demonstrate the different 
effects in serious and less serious crimes; and second, a few offense types, 
which are not commonly associated with women, had very low subject 
totals. The most notable of these categories was murder, a typically male 
offense. 
The offender characteristic variables include only women,97 and the 
only significant races and ethnicities represented are African American, 
Caucasian, and Latina.98 Since the study includes only two races and one 
separate ethnicity, those variables are coded as African American versus 
non-African American (white) and Latina versus non-Latina. Race was 
chosen as a variable in the model because it is historically known to playa 
role in the judicial system. 
The other independent variables are as follows: age, 'school level pre-
admit' (highest school level completed prior to being admitted) and 'total 
income yr before' (total income earned the year preceding admission). The 
remaining characteristic variables are all dichotomous: whether or not they 
had a job; whether or not they were married; and whether or not they have 
children. The geographic location is the only contextual factor variable, 
and it is also dichotomously coded as residing 'in the South' versus 'not in 
the South.' 
Following Daly's approach, this study uses pretrial release decisions to 
95. See tables 1-4 infra, at 392-95. 
96. Choosing variables is concededly one of the most subjective points of quantitative 
empirical analysis, but it is clearly necessary for reasons of time and space. It would be 
impractical to include hundreds of variables in a model and attempt to analyze the results. 
97. I include only women in the model for the following reasons. First, there is a 
tendency to always place men at the center of discussion and theory for crime. Secondly, 
women generally receive more lenient treatment than men, indicating that there are multiple 
factors influencing women's treatment-more so than men. Lastly, a much smaller 
proportion of male offenders are primary caregivers, and studies tend to show that men with 
children do not receive nearly as much leniency as women with children. See Daly, 
Discrimination in the Criminal Courts, supra note 70, at 167-68. Therefore, while the 
courts should also give lenient treatment to men who are primary caregivers, the concerns 
for the protection of children are best studied in the area where it most commonly arises-in 
female offenders. 
98. All other races had too few numbers in the data set to be reliable. 
i itts . ;-
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measure the effects of familial paternalism and/or informal social control. 99 
More specifically, there are two stages to be tested in the pretrial process. 
The first stage is dichotomously coded as whether or not they had a pretrial 
release. A pretrial release means a release by the court, before trial but 
after being charged. Offenders are generally given this privilege on a 
discretionary basis on the condition that they will not break any laws and 
will appear for their scheduled court date. The second part of the pretrial 
process is the baillbond amount assigned to the defendant (coded into a 
monetary scale). Taken together, these variables allow for a 
comprehensive look at the pretrial decision-making process, as they relate 
to extra-legal factors. 
Using sentencing severity would likely be the best measure for 
analyzing variations in judicial treatment. Sentencing tends to reflect the 
most comprehensive overview of the defendant's actions and history. 
Unfortunately, the data set here has not allowed the use of this measure. 
The variables measuring sentencing severity had incredibly high rates of 
missing data, and this forced the focus of analysis to the pretrial process. 100 
Analysis of the pretrial process is generalizable to sentencing because 
many of the court's concerns are the same, and extra-legal factors seem to 
affect the two decision-making processes similarly. Furthermore, studies 
of the two areas have shown similar results. 
Linear and logistic regression101 were both necessary to analyze the two 
dependent variables in the model. In the analysis of the pretrial release 
decisions, logistic regression was utilized because it is a dichotomous 
dependent variable. On the other hand, linear regression was used in the 
baillbond amount analysis because it is a continuous variable. Each of 
these procedures has been regularly employed in recent studies of pretrial 
1 d . d" 102 re ease an sentencIng eCIsIons. 
99. See Daly, Neither Conflict nor Labeling nor Paternalism Will Suffice, supra note 19 
(analyzing both pretrial releases and sentencing). 
100. Another disappointing factor was that a good measure of prior offenses was not 
available from the data set. All the measures for prior offenses had significantly high 
incidence of missing data, or were not comprehensive on total legal history. It is important 
to note that the lack of a prior offense variable dramatically reduces the R-Square in the 
analysis of baillbond amount but does not affect the validity of the rest of the analysis. 
101. Multiple regression allows one to hold variables constant in order to more accurately 
determine the impact of other variables. Therefore, it allows one to accurately determine the 
impact of individual variables that may have a high correlation with one another. For 
example, education level and income level are highly correlated. However, a correlational 
model will not allow one to determine what other factors may also be causing the increased 
income level. Multiple regression allows one to enter in many variables, and the statistical 
model will allow one to see the exact impact that each variable causes on the dependent 
variable. 
102. See, e.g., Daly, Neither Conflict nor Labeling nor Paternalism Will Suffice, supra 
note 19; Bickle & Peterson, supra note 4. 
Summer 1999] PROTECTING CHILDREN 385 
c. RESULTS 
1. Pretrial Release Decision 
The descriptive variabies103 in the sample indicate a few interesting 
results in and of themselves. On average, violent offenders are a few years 
older than property offenders and also tend to have slightly less education. 
Roughly one half of both violent and property offenders have jobs, and 
violent offenders tend to make slightly less money. The most dramatic set 
of statistics was found when the percentage of married were compared to 
the percentage with children. While the proportion of offenders who 
received a pretrial release and have children is quite high (violent = 76% 
and property = 80%), the proportion who are married is quite low (violent 
= 17% and property = 22%). It is likely that an offender who is both 
married and has children would be highly significant. The data seems to 
match the trend in recent studies where high proportions of offenders in the 
criminal justice system have children, while few are married. 
Table 2 shows the results of the logistic regressional analysis for 
pretrial release. As predicted, the significance of specific variables varied 
by offense severity. While having children was only marginally significant 
for violent offenders, it was clearly significant for property offenders. The 
odds ratio shows that property offenders with children are 1.4863 times as 
likely to receive a pretrial release than property offenders without children. 
A similar result was found in the case of having a job or business. For 
property offenders, having a job or business made them 1.344 times as 
likely to receive a pretrial release than unemployed offenders. 
Being married had no significant effect on the likelihood of pretrial 
release among property offenders. For violent offenders, on the other hand, 
married women are 1.5692 times as likely to receive a pretrial release than 
non-married women. Also significant, Latina property offenders are 
0.3008 times less likely to receive a pretrial release than non-Latinas. 
Violent offenders residing in the South, interestingly, are 1.3897 times 
as likely to receive a pretrial release than violent offenders not in the South. 
The last significant variable, age, has only a minimal affect. For every one 
year increase in a violent offender's age, she is 1.0152 times as likely to 
receive a pretrial release. As for the less important variables, 'school level 
pre-admit' and 'total income year before' were both not significant in the 
pretrial analysis. Surprisingly, being African American was also not 
significant in the pretrial analysis. 104 
2. BaillBond Amount 
The descriptive variables for the analysis of baillbond amount are quite 
103. See table 1. 
104. I will analyze these results in the discussion section below. 
au 
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similar to those for the pretrial release. 105 The variable worth pointing out 
is the baillbond amount, which shows a large difference between means for 
violent offenders and those for property offenders (violent = $56,418.08 
and property = $18,659.95).106 
Table 4 illustrates the linear regressional analysis of baillbond amount 
for violent and property offenders. It is immediately evident that there are 
less significant variables in the baillbond amount analysis for property 
offenders than in any other part of the model. For property offenders, 
being African American is not quite significant; but for violent offenders, it 
has the largest effect in the baillbond analysis. If a violent offender is 
African American, she will have on average a $40,969 decrease in her 
baillbond amount. Interestingly enough, being Latina has no significant 
effect on baillbond amount. If a female offender is in the South, no matter 
what type of offense, she will receive a lower baillbond amount. Violent 
offenders in the South receive a $22,345 decrease in their baillbond 
amount, as opposed to non-southern offenders. Also, property offenders in 
the South receive a $7,556 decrease in their baillbond amount. 
Surprisingly, having ajob or business was not significant. School level 
prior to admittance is the only variable in the analysis that increased bail 
bond amount. For every grade level increase among violent offenders, the 
baillbond amount increased by $3,312. It is also important to note that 
marriage was not significant in affecting the baillbond amount. However, 
having children was significant for violent offenders. Violent offenders 
with children receive $18,591 lower baillbond amounts than do violent 
offenders without children. Taken together, the two analyses (pretrial 
release and baillbond amount) form a comprehensive reflection of the 
pretrial decision-making process. The results of the statistical analyses will 
now be explained within the present theoretical framework. 
D. DISCUSSION 
1. Familial Paternalism 
. As predicted, having children had a significant effect in increasing the 
likelihood of pretrial release and decreasing the baillbond amount. Even 
though the effect of having children is not the same across offense types, 
the finding is still consistent with the hypothesis of this study. The analysis 
indicates that violent offenders do not have an increased likelihood of a 
pretrial release when they have children. Several reasons could explain this 
effect. First, as a part of familial paternalism, the court may find that the 
violent act expresses a characteristic of the mother that makes her unfit to 
105. See table 3. 
106. This large difference makes sense considering the differing severity of offenses. The 
large standard deviations also illustrate the wide range of bail/bond amounts within each 
section (violent and property). 
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care for her own children. If the court perceives this from the offender she 
will not be granted an opportunity for release or will receive a larger 
baillbond amount. While this is possible, it is only likely to occur in rare 
cases, because the analysis shows that violent offenders with children are 
likely to receive lower baillbond amounts. Therefore, the result of this 
scenario is that most offenders who have children are generally seen as fit 
mothers. 107 
The most obvious explanation for this lack of significance (of having 
children for violent offenders in the pretrial release analysis) is simply that, 
regardless of having children, the baillbond amount for violent crimes is 
too high for a large number of people to pay. The average baillbond 
amount for violent offenders is $56,418.28, and even with their decreased 
baillbond amount from having children (-$18,591) the amount is still too 
high for many of them to afford. This is compounded by the fact that, on 
average, violent offenders only made $5,667 in the year preceding their 
incarceration. 108 Another statistic that supports this explanation is the 
difference in the percentage of women who actually get a pretrial release. 
For violent offenders, only forty-three percent of them were released, while 
fifty-two percent of property offenders received a pretrial release. The 
difference may seem small, but it is likely that the cost of release explains 
much of the difference in who was actually released. 
The only other competing explanation for the different percentage of 
offenders that do receive a pretrial release is that some violent offenders are 
not given the option by the court. However, there are actually very few 
women who commit serious enough crimes to have their baillbond option 
revoked. Therefore, it is consistent with the theory of familial paternalism 
for the violent offenders not to have a greater likelihood of pretrial release 
when they have children. The more important question was whether 
property offenders-who on average have much lower baillbond 
amounts-were more likely to receive a pretrial release if they had 
children, and that was found to be true. 
An interesting finding on the significance of having children is that on 
average, while property offenders with children have an increased chance 
of a pretrial release, they do not receive decreased baillbond amounts. I09 
The most important test of familial paternalism is whether violent offenders 
with children receive baillbond reductions, and in the analysis here they do. 
107. Having a decreased baillbond amount because a woman has a child does not 
necessarily mean that the judge sees her as a good mother. However, one can at least 
conclude that the judge deems the defendant to be a good enough mother to want her to be 
at home with her children, as opposed to being held in jail. 
108. Note there is also the possibility that they would put up a piece of property as 
collateral on a baillbond or have another relative do the same. However, one must 
remember the low socioeconomic status of the vast majority of these offenders. The mean 
income for all the groups in the data set was around $6000. See tables 1 and 3. 
109. Compare tables 2 and 4. 
IE 
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However, property offenders did not receive this decrease and that creates a 
strange predicament. One would assume that property offenders would be 
more likely than violent offenders to receive lenient treatment for having 
children because a violent offender would be more likely deemed an unfit 
parent; however, the data does not seem to indicate this. A possible 
explanation for this discrepancy is that courts might not really be concerned 
about the children. Instead, the increased chance of pretrial release for 
property offenders with children could originate simply from the mothers 
who have the extra incentive to go home to their children. This would then 
explain why there is no decrease in baillbond amounts for these property 
offenders. However, it is unlikely that judges do not consider the presence 
of children since violent offenders with children receive lower baillbond 
amounts. The more probable explanation for the lack of significance for 
property offenders is that baillbond amounts for property offenders are 
already low. Even with their concern for the offender's children, judges 
may feel that the mother should be able to post that bond and are not 
inclined to lower the amount further. 
The second, yet less significant, part of familial paternalism is 
marriage. The only time that being married was significant was in the 
increased likelihood of pretrial release for violent offenders. I interpret this 
to mean one of three possibilities. First, it could mean that judges are 
trying to protect family solidarity (following the theory of familial 
paternalism). Second, it could mean that judges believe the individual is 
well grounded from informal social control (i.e., from her spouse) and 
doesn't need the supervision of the state (i.e., does not need to be held prior 
to the trial). However, these two possibilities can be rejected because 
marriage was not found to lower the baillbond amount, and the baillbond 
amount is generally the only other way the judge can affect whether the 
individual will actually be released before trial (another possible way 
would be denying release which only happens in rare circumstances). The 
third, and most logical explanation, is probably that married female 
offenders are more likely to have the money to afford their baillbond 
amount because of the additional financial resources provided by their 
spouse. However, even this explaination is not entirely consistent because 
property offenders should therefore also be able to enjoy the increased 
likelihood of release from having extra resources from their spouse.110 
Assuming that this last explanation is true implies that within the 
110. Marriage poses somewhat of an anomaly in statistical studies. An informal social 
control model would predict that marriage would create lenient treatment. However, some 
scholars predict that marriage may actually create harsher treatment because: 1) the judge 
will believe that children will be cared for by the spouse, or 2) sexist/chivalrous argument-
that the defendant with a spouse (and the responsibilities that go along with marriage) 
should have known better than to risk committing a crime. Note that the latter argument can 
also be applied to a theory for the harsher treatment of mothers-they are risking 
incarceration and putting their children at risk. 
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familial paternalism framework the judge is basically thinking about 
protecting the children only-not the family in general. Therefore, the 
marriage variable does not inhibit the explanatory success of familial 
paternalism, but it does create problems for the theoretical accuracy of 
informal social control. III 
2. Informal Social Control 
This study found limited confirmation on informal social control. The 
theory predicts that children, marriage, employment, and to a lesser extent, 
age, income and education will create more leniency for the defendant. 
First, as explained above, children were found to be generally significant in 
creating leniency. However, for the theory to be accurate, some of the 
other variables must also be significant. If having children was the only 
significant variable, then it would only lend itself to suggesting that the 
courts are concerned with children, not that the defendants have more 
informal social controls on them. 
Second, being married is not a consistent factor which increases the 
chance of pretrial release, nor a factor that decreases the offender's 
baillbond amount. This is a failed prediction on which the theory depends, 
although it is only part of what the hypothesis and theory entail. Another 
prediction of informal social control is that having a job will increase the 
offender's chances of a pretrial release and decrease her baillbond amount. 
The hypothesis is correct only in that property offenders were more likely 
to have a pretrial release if they had a job or business. Again, this does not 
truly confirm the theory's prediction. When looking at the possible reasons 
why having a job increases the probability of having a pretrial release, the 
explanation does not necessarily support informal social control. The 
rationale behind this theory is that the court will view an offender that has a 
job as more grounded, already having informal social control placed on 
their lives, and are therefore lacking the need for formal control. If the 
court was acting as the informal social control theory predicts, property 
offenders' baillbond amounts would have been reduced as well. Moreover, 
courts do not appear to act consistent with informal social control in 
regards to violent offenders, which is probably a product of the court's 
unwillingness to stretch it's confidence in this rationale to people who have 
committed violent crimes. 
Possible explanations can be inferred from this discussion on pretrial 
releases into the discussion on the lack of significance of having a job or 
business on baillbond amount. It seems reasonable that courts would not 
be willing to lower the baillbond amount for violent offenders, and this 
probably correlates with the lack of significance for pretrial release of 
111. The general lack of significance for marriage shows that the theory of familial 
paternalism should be narrowly construed to include only the variable of children-that 
courts are only concerned with protecting innocent children. 
-
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violent offenders. As for the baillbond amount for property offenders, the 
lack of effect from having a job or business may reflect the court's 
disregard for the offender's employment status. On the other hand, this 
could also be a product of the court's view that a person with a job should 
be able to pay the standard baillbond for the crime. To conclude, while the 
likelihood of having a pretrial release is increased by having a job, the 
increase is most likely due to the offender having money, not the court's 
leniency from its confidence in informal social controls. The general lack 
of significance for employment and marriage make informal social 
control's predictions frequently inaccurate for this data set. 
Other findings further undermine the validity of the theory of informal 
social control. An offender's total income the year before her arrest was 
not found significant in any area. This is a bit troubling for the theory: an 
offender's income should partially reflect her level of grounding and 
responsibility, again the prediction fails. 
The limited significance of both age and the offender's education prior 
to her arrest (school level pre-admit) seem to answer the final questions 
about informal social control's predictions in this study. The projections 
made by informal social control have generally not been supported. The 
general insignificance of most of informal social control's predicting 
variables seems to show that courts are not very concerned with the 
defendant's level of responsibility and grounding when it comes to pretrial 
decisions. Note that one of informal social control's predicting variables is 
having children, and that variable was in fact found to be significant. This 
could possibly demonstrate that courts are looking at the defendant's 
responsibility and grounding, making the theory relatively accurate. 
However, the lack of significance of the other informal social control 
variables suggests otherwise. As far as extra-legal factors, the courts seem 
to be mainly concerned with innocent children when it comes to decisions 
that affect the likelihood of the women's releases. 
3. Race and Ethnicity 
The results of the analysis regarding African American and Latina 
offenders show highly significant, albeit inconsistent, support for the 
predictions. The two variables with the largest effects in the two stages 
(pretrial release and baillbond amount) of the model are being African 
American and being Latina. However, each variable is not significant in 
both stages-nor are they significant in both offense types. If a property 
offender is Latina, she is much more likely not to be released before trial, 
but there is no effect for either pretrial release for violent offenders or for 
the baillbond amount for either offense. Since the Latina effect is not 
universal, one can argue that their low likelihood of pretrial release is not a 
product of overt racial discrimination, but that it is a result of financial 
circumstances. Latinas do not have higher baillbond amounts, thus pretrial 
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detainment may be from lack of funds for bail. The only competing 
explanation for the lower likelihood of pretrial release is that property 
offenders are rarely held over with no possibility of posting baillbond. 
Therefore lower likelihood seems to be a product of circumstance and not 
judicial discrimination. This finding does not follow predictions, although 
its inconclusiveness seems to follow in the trend of prior studies. 1l2 
If a violent offender is African American, she will receive a large 
decrease in the level of her baillbond amount (-$40,969). This is a 
tremendous decrease and does not follow predictions. There are three 
possible explanations for this finding. First, differing from prior qualitative 
research and case studies, these results may indicate that the court does not 
racially discriminate in pretrial decisions. It is also possible that the court 
is taking the economic circumstances of African Americans into account. 
Due to historically ingrained institutional factors-rooting from slavery 
and Jim Crow-a substantial proportion of the African American 
population is in a low socioeconomic status, 1 13 and as a result, black 
offenders are more likely to have lower incomes than white offenders. The 
court may be taking this into account by lowering their baillbond amount to 
make it more proportional to their income. If this is true, it may indicate 
that the court is more sympathetic to systematic oppression than we 
thought; however, research on institutional racism and case studies show 
that this is unlikely.1l4 This possible sympathy by courts is also 
questionable because Latina offenders do not receive the same decrease in 
their baillbond amount, and they tend to face relatively similar systemic 
oppression. 
Second, another possibility is related to the phenomenon in which 
defendants are treated more leniently when the victim of the crime is 
African American. This type of treatment could explain the dramatic drop 
in baillbond amounts for African American offenders, because most crimes 
committed by African American offenders are perpetrated on other African 
Americans-thus the phenomenon of 'black-on-black' crime. 
The third possible explanation for this finding on race and ethnicity is 
112. See, e.g., Daly, Neither Conflict nor Labeling nor Paternalism Will Suffice, supra 
note 19, at 137, 140-43; Bickle and Peterson, supra note 4, at 377. 
113. See, e.g., WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE 
NEW URBAN POOR 25-34 (1997) (explaining the incredible loss of available jobs in the 
1970s and 1980s which disproportionately affected African Americans). 
114. See, e.g., PAUL HARRIS, BLACK RAGE CONFRONTS THE LAW 265-66 (1997) 
(illustrating institutional racism by pointing to examples such as crack cocaine versus 
powdered cocaine mandatory sentencing disparities). Harris also points to other studies 
such as: a 1995 study of 80,000 federal convictions which found that African Americans 
received sentences which on average were 10% higher than similarly convicted white 
offenders; a study in California which demonstrated that white offenders had their charges 
"reduced more often than African Americans or Latino/as, and that white offenders received 
community-based rehabilitation placements at twice the rate of African Americans." Id. at 
265. 
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that intersections between race, gender and parenthood are very 
complicated. Judicial perceptions and stereotypes on these intersecting 
issues seem to playa large role in determining who receives leniency if 
they have children.115 What furthers this argument are findings in other 
studies that show that African American men do not receive leniency for 
having children, while African American women dO. 116 This is 
compounded by the finding that white men also receive leniency for having 
children. 117 This would indicate that judges do not concern themselves 
with race when it comes to mothers and the welfare of their children, but 
race does matter for fathers. Other studies have also found that perceptions 
of African American and Latina parents have influenced judicial decisions. 
For example, African American women's "childcare arrangements-a 
model of sharing with female kin-may not comport with court officials' 
notions of appropriate motherhood.,,118 Furthermore, although there is a 
strong popular perception that Latino men and Latina women are more 
"family oriented," studies provide little judicial corroboration of this 
perception. 119 The result of these intersecting issues is a difficult 
phenomenon to measure. However, what is clear is that race is not 
consistently found to be significant in statistical studies but is found to be 
important in qualitative studies. 
4. Geographic Location 
Residence in the South has a surprising effect. If an offender (violent 
or property) is in the South, she will receive a much lower bail/bond 
amount than if she were outside the South. Also, if a violent offender is in 
the South she will be much more likely to have a pretrial release. The most 
plausible explanation for this finding is the traditional chivalrous treatment 
of women that is often found in the South, which seems to show a degree 
of willingness to let the women off easier because the men do not want to 
115. Note that these inconsistent findings are actually similar to most findings in other 
quantitative studies. See, e.g., DALY, GENDER, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 3, at 5 
(Daly points out that most statistical studies do not find racial differences and argues that 
this may be a result of mismeasurements of justice-i.e., it may be literally impossible to 
measure the racial differences statistically because of all the intersecting factors that go into 
the judge's rationale). 
116. In general, discrimination against African Americans tends to be more severe against 
men than women. See, e.g., Cassia Spohn et aI., Women Defendants in Court: The 
Interaction Between Sex and Race in Convicting and Sentencing, 66 Soc. SCI. Q. 178, 182 
(1985) (author found that black men were sentenced more harshly than black women and 
concluded that it was a result of race discrimination, and not paternalism, in favor of 
women). See also Coramae Richey Mann, Race and Sentencing of Female Felons: A Field 
Study, 7 INT'L. J. WOMEN'S STUD. 160, 170 (1984). 
117. See Daly, Neither Conflict nor Labeling nor Paternalism Will Suffice, supra note 19, 
at 143, 160. 
118. Id. at 143 (citing E.M. MILLER, STREET WOMAN (1986)). 
119. Id. at 143 (citing M. Baca Zinn, Mexican-American Women in the Social Sciences, 8 
SIGNS: 1. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC'Y 259 (1982)). 
--- -----------~-.----
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see 'their' women in prison. It is possible that leniency comes from respect 
for women, but it is more likely a result of traditional female paternalism-
that women are inferior "to men because of their putative need to be 
supported, guided, and protected.,,120 This is an unexpected finding, and 
seems to revive some use for the basic theory of female paternalism. 
5. Theoretical Conclusions 
Overall, the theory of familial paternalism seems to be the most 
accurate explanation for the effects of extra-legal factors on judicial 
decision-making. Children, and not marriage, is the factor which appears 
to create substantial leniency in the pretrial process. Informal social 
control theory did not accurately predict factors that create leniency. This 
study lends more support to Daly's critique of Kruttschnitt's theory. She 
believes Kruttschnitt mistakenly looks to economic factors instead of the 
issue of parenthood. 121 These findings show that informal social control 
mistakenly puts the locus of control on economic factors instead of on 
protecting children. The other maj or finding that can be taken from this 
study is the effect of being in the South on the decision-making process. 
This possibly paternalistic trend, occurring only in the South, highlights a 
judicial inconsistency that needs to be addressed. 
In hindsight, there are a number of measures that could have been 
taken to increase the validity of this study, which should be noted for future 
research. In order to more accurately explain the results of this study, the 
baillbond amount should have been added as an independent variable in the 
pretrial release analysis. This would have helped to explain the effects of 
being Latina and African American in the pretrial release analysis. Also, 
marriage and children could have been coded together in stages to further 
analyze the predictions of familial paternalism. Additionally, having 
children could have been combined with the other variables to provide 
further comparisons. 
One major step that should be taken in future research in this area is the 
creation of a national data set that includes an accurate account of prior 
offenses and a meticulous account of the severity of the offender's current 
crime. Up to this point, no data of this type exists. When analyzing the 
results in this study, one can only hope that prior offenses are not heavily 
skewed for one group versus another, yet this remains as a possibility. 
Other researchers have conducted state and regional studies on narrow 
offense types with accurate prior offense variables, but their results are of 
only limited generalizability. To increase the validity of empirical studies 
on the judicial process and factors of lenience, a well-rounded national data 
set must be constructed. 
120. Daly, Rethinking Judicial Paternalism, supra note 14, at 10. 
121. See Daly, Discrimination in the Criminal Courts, supra note 70. 
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Table 1. Means/Percentages and Standard Deviations of Variables Used In the 
Analyses of Pretrial Release 
Violent Offenders 
Variable (N=888) 
African American 0.49 (.500) 
Latino 0.087 (.282) 
South 0.454 (.498) 
Age 31.949 (9.531) 
School Level Pre-Admit* 10.938 (2.707) 
Had Job/Business 0.511 (.500) 
Total Income Yr Before $5667 (3,854.00) 
Married 0.171 (.377) 
Have Children 0.756 (.430) 
Pretrial Release 0.426 (.495) 
Notes: 
*Numbers represent High School level last finished. 
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Table 2. Analyses of Pretrial Release for Violent and Property Offenders 
Violent Offenders Property Offenders 
Variable (N=888) (N=861) 
B Exp (B) B Exp (B) 
African American .1496 1.1613 -.1623 0.8502 
(.1435) (.1485) 
Latino -.4144 0.6607 -1.2012*** 0.3008 
(.2678) (.3313) 
South .3291* 1.3897 .2364 1.2667 
(.1417) (.1427) 
Age .0150* 1.0152 .0111 1.0112 
(.0075) (.0099) 
School Level Pre-Admit -.0090 0.991 -.0238 0.9765 
(.0270) (.0306) 
Had Job/Business .2011 1.2228 .2957* 1.344 
(.1446) (.1467) 
Total Income Yr Before .0182 1.0184 -.0269 0.9735 
(.0194) (.0191) 
Married .4506* 1.5692 .2156 1.2406 
(.1844) (.1709) 
Have Children .2392 1.2702 .3963* 1.4863 
(.1662) (.1858) 
-2 Log Likelihood 1182.561 1156.608 
Model Chi-Square 28.n4 35.726 
df 9 9 
Significance 0.0007 0.0000 
Notes: 
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors. 
396 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:2 
Table 3. Means/Percentages and Standard Deviations of Variables Used in the 
Analyses of BaIVBond Amount 
Violent Offenders 
Variable (N=669) 
African American 0.495 (.500) 
Latino 0.085 (.279) 
South 0.433 (.496) 
Age 31.816 (9.774) 
School Level Pre-Admit* 10.996 (2.658) 
Had Job/Business 0.499 (.500) 
Total Income Yr Before $5,589 (3,839.00) 
Married 0.188 (.391) 
Have Children 0.761 (.427) 
Bail/Bond Amount $56,418.28 (96,411.08) 
Notes: 
* Numbers represent High School level last finished. 
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Table 4. Analyses of BaiVBond Amount for Violent and Property Offenders 
Violent Offenders Property Offenders 
Variable (N=669) (N=638) 
B Beta B Beta 
African American -40.969*** -0.21262 -5.543 -0.06092 
(7.463) (3.781) 
Latino -24.246 -0.07026 3.794 0.018284 
(13.398) (8.401) 
South -22.345** -0.11494 -7.556* -0.08336 
(7.437) (3.642) 
Age -0.116 -0.01184 .0614 0.01003 
(0.379) (.256) 
School Level Pre-Admit 3.312* 0.091336 1.014 0.05401 
(1.430) (.798) 
Had Job/Business 8.821 0.045781 -1.402 -0.01547 
(7.507) (3.729) 
Total Income Yr Before 0.106 0.004257 .8375 0.072356 
(1.015) (.486) 
Married -5.857 -0.023n -1.828 -0.01707 
(9.396) (4.302) 
Have Children -18.591* -0.08232 -.8709 -0.00788 
(8.616) (4.671) 
Intercept 65.981 8.266 
(21.909) (11.751) 
R Square 0.08288 0.02446 
Adjusted R Square 0.07036 0.01047 
Notes: 
*p< .05 **p< .01 ***p< .001 
Coefficients are divided by 1000 for ease of interpretation. 
Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors. 
e 
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PART IT: SHOULD PARENTHOOD BE CONSIDERED BY 
JUDGES? 
Since it appears that judges often take the presence of children into 
account, the question remains whether this practice should be stopped. 
Congress and many state legislatures have taken steps to restrict judicial 
discretion, attempting to create balanced and gender-neutral sentencing. 122 
Their basic goal has been to treat defendants who have committed the same 
crime similarly. 123 However, their efforts appear overzealous and 
shortsighted. First, restricting judges' discretion when it comes to issues of 
familial responsibility affects the children of both male and female 
defendants. For example, the United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
include a system in which considering the familial circumstances of the 
defendant is the exception, not the norm.124 Second, gender-neutral laws 
do not take into consideration the gendered nature of crime and the 
gendered nature of care-taking. As a result, female offenders who are most 
often the primary caretakers of children 125 are actually more stringently 
penalized along with their innocent children.126 
On the other side of this debate are the concerns of some feminists, 
who argue that allowing for consideration of familial circumstances 
actually perpetuates female stereotypes. Put in this framework, we seem to 
be forced to choose between fair sentencing, which allows for 
consideration of protecting innocent children, and discouraging sexist 
stereotypes of women's roles in society. However, these two goals may 
not actually oppose one another. It may be possible to work towards both 
of these goals by creating a new gender-conscious or gender-neutral system 
that allows judges to take familial responsibilities into consideration. 
Part A addresses the issues concerning the protection of children and 
why leniency for parents is often necessary to protect children. Part B 
briefly explains the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the guideline rules 
against ordinarily considering familial circumstances. Lastly, Part C will 
address issues on gendered roles, the gendered nature of crime and the 
feminist debate on the lenient treatment of parents (who are predominantly 
mothers). The conclusion is that over-regulation to achieve uniformity in 
sentencing is not the answer; fairness to each individual defendant in the 
system must be our primary concern in order to allow for greater protection 
of children. 
122. See U.S.S.O., supra note 8, at 5Hl.lO. 
123. See id. 
124. See U.S.S.O., supra note 8, at § 5H1.6 (stating that "[f]amily ties" are "not ordinarily 
relevant" in detennining whether a departure from the guidelines will be granted). 
125. The children of most male offenders end up with the mother; however, the children of 
most female offenders cannot rely on their fathers. See Raeder, supra note 12, at 952. 
126. See id. at 923. 
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A. PROTECTING CHILDREN 
Meet Sandy: 127 she is 27 years old and has two children-James (2 
years old) and Andrea (6 years old). Sandy is a cashier at a food store, 
where she works from 35 to 40 hours a week. However, as she is 
considered a part-time employee she and her children have no health 
benefits and she cannot afford health insurance. Sandy's ex-husband, who 
was abusive to her and the children, refuses to help support the children 
financially. Her mother is dead and she never knew her father. She is not 
close to any other family members. Sandy works in the suburbs but lives in 
the inner-city, she must commute to work every day. Sandy is a working-
class woman. She lives paycheck to paycheck with just enough money for 
rent, food and daycare. 
However, her life took a tum for the worse when her car broke down. 
She needed four hundred dollars to get her car fixed, she had no money and 
has bad credit. Sandy has no means to pay the bill, and, therefore, no way 
to get to work. She feels trapped and will do anything to get the money. 
She remembers that a young man who lives down the hall in her apartment 
building offered her a 'courier' job at one time, and she suspected it could 
have meant transporting drugs, but that no longer mattered to her. He paid 
her four hundred dollars to make a list of deliveries-she was arrested mid-
way through her list. She was charged and convicted under federal law on 
drug charges. Now comes the sentencing phase of trial. She has two 
priors-when she was eighteen years old she was arrested for shoplifting 
and possession of marijuana. Should she go to jail? What happens to her 
children if she does? Is it probable that she will ever sell drugs again? Is 
she a threat to society? 
This hypothetical scenario is an example of the common background of 
a female offender who stands in front of a court everyday somewhere 
across the country.128 Meanwhile, policy makers and legislators have been 
attempting to determine what would constitute fair punishment. However, 
most legislators do not seem to picture this woman when creating a model 
of punishment. 129 Policy makers use the average male offender as their 
center-point when creating legislation that regulates sentencing to shrink 
judicial discretion. 130 Judges, on the other hand, function differently; they 
see the defendant standing in front of them and take into account a wide 
range of extra-legal factors. Many recently enacted sentencing statutes are 
aimed at curbing this wide-open evaluation process where judges have 
traditionally reigned free. 
127. Sandy is a fictitious creation, compiled through facts of real cases. See, e.g., infra 
note 160 (actual profiles of defendants). 
128. See id. 
129. See DALY, GENDER, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 3, at 269. 
130. See id. Daly argues that gender neutral policies are actually not neutral, but are "male 
centered." See section C below for expansion of this discussion. 
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Why do judges tend to take children into consideration? There is 
ample evidence indicating that incarcerating a parent, especially a mother, 
is detrimental to her children. To put this effect into context, consider that 
incarcerated people are predominantly single. 131 For example, in the study 
above, only seventeen to twenty-three percent of the women in state prison 
were married. 132 Furthermore, other studies have shown male marriage 
. f 133 h· 134 rates rangmg rom twenty-one percent to t lrty-one percent. 
Therefore, a second parent is often not readily available to care for the 
child. As will be discussed below, fathers of the children of female 
offenders are less likely to make themselves available to care for the 
children than mothers of the children of male offenders. 
The detrimental effects of incarceration on children are astounding. 
When the second parent is unavailable, these children are placed with 
relatives, neighbors, foster care or even in institutional orphanages. 135 
Incarceration of a parent is also known to create a host of behavioral and 
psychological problems for children.136 Furthermore, it results in the 
increased likelihood of criminal behavior by the children, creating a cycle 
of crime. 137 Judges have commented on the effect of incarcerating a parent 
by stating that it "tends to result in the child ending up in prison as well. ,,138 
Myrna Raeder also points out that incarceration can lead to the loss of 
parental rights in many states. 139 Indeed, the economic, criminal, 
psychological and social costs of incarcerating parents create substantial 
reasons to consider parenthood when sentencing. 
It is a difficult process to balance these utilitarian concerns with those 
of punishment, incapacitation and deterrence. How one weighs these 
different concerns is influenced by political beliefs and personal interests. 
For example, most socio-legal and criminology scholars who research in 
the area of sentencing and its impact on children tend to find the 
consideration of children a necessity.l40 However, lllene H. Nagel, a 
131. See, e.g., tables 1 and 3. 
132. See id. The range in percentages are taken from the different parts of the model for 
both violent and property offenders, and as can be seen, the frequency of marriage stays 
relatively similar through the different parts of the model. 
133. See Daly, Neither Conflict Nor Labeling Nor Paternalism Will Suffice, supra note 19, 
at 144. 
134. See Bickle & Peterson, supra note 4, at 382. 
135. See Raeder, supra note 12, at 953. 
136. See Tracy Tyson, Downward Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: 
Are Parenthood and Pregnancy Appropriate Sentencing Considerations?, 2 S. CAL. REv. L. 
& WOMEN'S STUD. 577,604 (1993). 
137. See, e.g., Raeder, supra note 12, at 953-54. 
138. United States v. Concepcion, 795 F.Supp. 1262, 1283 (E.D.N.Y.1992). While one 
cannot simply conclude from this that parental incarceration is the sole cause of the 
increased criminality of the children, it is clear that parental incarceration plays a substantial 
part in causing criminality in children. 
139. See Raeder, supra note 12, at 954. 
140. See, e.g., Raeder, supra note 12, at 959-60; DALY, GENDER, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, 
!t&SSS 
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member of the United States Sentencing Commission argues for the greater 
importance of deterrence and punishment to uphold the underlying policies 
behind the Sentencing Reform ACt. 141 Nagel also argues that consideration 
of children dilutes sentencing policies and places too much importance on 
issues that are "exogenous to these sentencing purposes.,,142 While giving 
some consideration for utilitarian concerns for children, Nagel and Johnson 
state that "exogenous considerations are rarely sufficiently important to 
outweigh either culpability or crime control considerations in the allocation 
of sentences.,,143 It is unfortunate that members of the United States 
Sentencing Commission do not place more importance on children, while 
they concurrently give more lenient treatment to offenders who assist 
prosecutors by offering evidence against other criminals. 144 What 
happened to their concerns about just desserts and equal punishment? It 
seems that giving offenders their just desserts is only done when it is at 
their convenience. These policies send the message that individual justice 
and fairness are not as important as the commission's underlying goals of 
incarcerating as many offenders as possible, for as long as possible. 
As a society, we must evaluate the cost of uniformity in sentencing 
when innocent children are involved. 145 This is not to say that all or even 
most parents should be treated leniently by the courts. There are clear 
cases where the offender has committed a crime of such high severity that 
he or she must be punished with incarceration for the purposes of 
retribution and societal protection. In those cases, it may be in the interest 
of the children to be separated from the parent. 146 However, those 
determinations involve fact-specific issues which are best left to be 
d . db· d 147 etenrune y JU ges. 
supra note 3, at 169, 270-71 (arguing against what Daly terms the "charade" of gender 
neutral sentencing and the male centered view of present theories of punishment). 
141. See Nagel & Johnson, supra note 10, at 207-08. 
142. [d. at 207. 
143. [d. 
144. See V.S.S.G., supra note 8, at § 5K1.1, p.s. 
145. Daly notes that there is an inherent conflict between uniformity and individuality. 
While uniformity demands equality of treatment against each offender, individuality 
demands evaluating the specific factors about each offender and their case. See DALY, 
GENDER, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 3, at 265. 
146. Some scholars also argue against a mechanical process to determine departures 
because it not only takes the decision out of the hands of the judge, who is in the best 
position to make the most equitable decision, but also because it "might result in vulnerable 
single parents and pregnant women being pressured into committing crimes," similar to the 
attraction for minors. See Jody L. King, Avoiding Gender Bias in Downward Departures 
for Family Responsibilities Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 273,303 (1996). 
147. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, for example, have outlined average "heartland" 
cases in order to demonstrate where judges should fit actual cases into the guidelines. 
V.S.S.G., supra note 8, at § 1A4(b). However, as will be discussed in section B below, 
these attempts to categorize crimes have restricted judges' discretion in cases where the 
crimes do not seem to warrant severe punishment, and where other factors, such as children, 
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Also note that the average female offender is a nonviolent offender, 
with fewer and less severe priors than the average male offender. 148 As 
will be discussed in section C below, when we recognize the gendered roles 
in society and the gendered nature of crime, we are then forced to ask 
whether gender-neutral laws are actually equitable. But fIrst, it is necessary 
to show the processes and results of a gender-neutral sentencing law-the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines provides a perfect example. 
B. FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines went into effect in 1987.149 The 
purpose of the Guidelines is to eliminate disparity in sentencing and are 
based upon the notion that all offenders deserve uniform punishment. 150 
The procedure established by the Commission requires judges to follow a 
model in which they sentence offenders according to a baseline that 
corresponds with the current crime. 151 That baseline level is adjusted up or 
down for exacerbating or mitigating factors. I52 This adjusted level is then 
cross-listed with the defendant's criminal history to create a limited 
guideline range for the judge. 153 
Beyond this the judge is allowed to use limited discretion. The 
guidelines are intended to be used if the offender's conduct and crime fit 
within the prescribed "heartland" cases. I54 If the judge determines that the 
offender does not fIt within these "heartland" cases, then he or she is 
permitted to grant a departure from the guidelines.I55 However, to depart 
from the guideline range, the judge must state reasons justifying the 
departure. The guidelines set forth two areas where departures are 
permitted: when offenders provide assistance to prosecutors in prosecuting 
another person; 156 and for factors or characteristics which were never 
adequately considered by the Commission. 157 
The Commission has determined that race, sex, national origin, creed, 
religion, socio-economic status and lack of guidance as a youth are not 
seem to warrant giving more lenient treatment. 
148. Women commit less serious types of crimes than men, and some argue that women 
are involved in "less serious fonns of some crimes" also. DALY, GENDER, CRIME, AND 
PUNISHMENT, supra note 3, at 260. 
149. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at § 1A2. 
150. See id. at § 1A3, p.s. See also United States v. McHan, 920 F.2d 244, 247 (4th Cir. 
1990) ("one of Congress' primary purposes in establishing the Guidelines was to reduce 
sentencing disparities and to rest sentences upon the offense committed, not upon the 
offender"). 
151. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at § 1B1.1(a), (b). 
152. See id., at § 1B1.1(c), (d), (e). 
153. See id., at U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1(0, (g). 
154. See id., at § 1A4(b), p.s. (the heartland cases are the types of cases which are typical 
to the offense, thus deserving the set punishment). 
155. See id. 
156. See ;d., at § 5K1.1, p.s. 
157. See id., at § 5K2.0, p.s. 
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relevant to sentencing and therefore cannot be used to determine sentence 
length. 158 Furthermore, it determined that family and community ties, age, 
education, vocational skills, mental and emotional condition, physical 
condition, appearance, employment and community service are "not 
ordinarily relevant.,,159 Following the guidelines, all the courts of appeals 
have held that departures for family responsibilities are permitted. 
However, they are only permitted when family responsibilities are deemed 
extraordinary.l60 Clearly, the Commission's policy is against frequent 
consideration of family responsibilities by judges. 161 
In deciding if departures are permitted, many courts grapple with the 
question of how to determine what is extraordinary. This problem is 
compounded by the fact that there is a great deal of conflict between the 
circuits on which family circumstances are extraordinary. For example, the 
Second and D.C. Circuit courts are the only jurisdictions to liberally 
construe this rule and hold that single parenthood and often parenthood 
itself are extraordinary. 162 Other circuits have been less willing to allow for 
departures. 163 
158. See id., at § 5Hl.lO, p.s. 
159. See id., at §§ 5H1.1-1.6, p.s. 
160. See United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 948 (1st CiT. 1993) (holding that the 
Guidelines allow for departures in unusual cases); United States v. Alba, 933 F.2d 1117, 
1122 (2d Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Gaskill, 991 F.2d 82, 85 (3d Cir. 1993) (same); 
United States v. Brand, 907 F.2d 31, 33 (4th Cir. 1990) (also holding that the Guidelines 
allow for the possibility of downward departures for family responsibilities in extraordinary 
circumstances), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1014 (1990); United States v. Brown, 29 F.3d 953, 
961 (5th Cir. 1994) (court held that a departure for parental responsibilities was improper 
unless there are unique circumstances), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1021 (1994); United States v. 
Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 506 (6th Cir. 1990) (court must determine if the case is sufficiently 
unusual to warrant a departure), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 844 (1990); United States v. Canoy, 
38 F.3d 893, 906 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that the court may depart from the Guidelines if 
family ties are extraordinary); United States v. Harrison, 970 F.2d 444,447 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(same); United States v. Mondello, 927 F.2d 1463, 1470 (9th CiT. 1991) (same); United 
States v. Pena, 930 F.2d 1486, 1495 (10th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Mogel, 956 
F.2d 1555, 1562 (lIth Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 857 (1992) (same); United States v. 
Blackwell, 897 F. Supp. 586, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (same). 
161. See U.S.S.G.,supra note 8, at § 5H1.6, p.s. 
162. See, e.g., Unites States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that 
defendant's independent responsibility for three young children was extraordinary); United 
States v. Jackson, 756 F.Supp. 23, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding that a departure from the 
Guidelines was permissible for a single mother with two children); United States v. Agu, 
763 F.Supp. 703, 704-05 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that potential loss of child custody was 
extraordinary and sufficient for a departure). 
163. See, e.g., United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1082-83 (3d CiT. 1991) (a 
defendant's responsibility for five young children was not extraordinary); United States v. 
Carr, 979 F.2d 51,54 (5th CiT. 1992) (supporting district court's finding that a single parent 
defendant was not extraordinary); United States v. Calhoun, 49 F.3d 231, 237 (6th CiT. 
1995) (holding that having responsibility for a 14-month old infant was not extraordinary); 
United States v. Harrison, 970 F.2d 444, 448 (8th CiT. 1992) (finding single parenthood not 
extraordinary); United States v. Cacho, 951 F.2d 308, 310-11 (lIth CiT. 1992) (holding that 
departure was not warranted for a defendant who was the mother of four small children). 
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The frequency of departures as a result of these rules on family 
responsibilities will now be considered. As J ody L. King points out, it 
seems that women are not receiving departures as often as they should. l64 
Women received fifty-six percent of the family-based departures given in 
1992/65 and only fourty-five percent of them in 1991. However, eighty 
percent of female inmates are single parents, while only nine percent of 
male inmates are single parents. 166 Notwithstanding other factors at play 
here, King estimates that family-based departures for female offenders 
should constitute around eighty percent of all the family-based departures 
given. 167 Also, proportional to other departures granted, family-based 
departures have steadily declined since 1989-falling from five percent of 
all departures in 1989, to two percent in 1992.168 Moreover, Myrna S. 
Raeder argues that more departures would probably be given for family-
based reasons "if the appellate climate were more hospitable.,,169 
Another problem with the extraordinary departure framework of the 
guidelines is that groups of offenders who have high rates of potentially 
problematic personal circumstances-such as having children-may no 
longer be considered to have extraordinary circumstances in the future. For 
example, a single woman with children has become a common trend; 
eighty-eight percent of all single parents are female. 170 The impact of 
incarceration on the children of an incarcerated single mother is great, and 
as single motherhood becomes more common it also becomes less 
extraordinary/71 these women will have less of a chance to receive 
departures--even though the detriment of incarcerating these mothers will 
be the same. Thus, the 'extraordinary' framework ignores the gendered 
nature of roles played by men and women. 
C. GENDERED NATURE OF CRIME AND FEMINIST DEBATE ON LENIENT 
TREATMENT 
"In sentencing, the deletion of gender assumes a world in which men 
and women have equal custody of their children."I72 Limiting the court's 
164. See King, supra note 146, at 298. 
165. See Raeder, supra note 12, at 937. 
166. See King, supra note 146, at 296. 
167. See id. (88% of all single parents are female). See also BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. 
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS xi (1992). 
168. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, ANNuAL REp. Table IX at 50 (1989); U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM'N ANNUAL REP. Table 49 (1992). 
169. Raeder, supra note 12, at 937. 
170. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 167. 
171. Single mothers are clearly not typical of the entire offender population. While men 
make up the overwhelming majority of offenders in the criminal justice system, male 
offender are much less likely to have primary child care responsibilities. See DOUGLAS C. 
McDONALD & KENNETH E. CARLSON, FEDERAL SENTENCING IN TRANSITION, 1986-90, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICAL SPECIAL REp. 2 (1992). 
172. Raeder, supra note 12, at 951. 
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discretion to grant departures for the presence of children will obviously 
harm the children of both male and female offenders. However, this type 
of limitation will more frequently harm children through the incarceration 
of female offenders. In the vast majority of cases, female offenders are the 
predominant caregivers of their children, while only a small percentage of 
1 f '.I: d . . 173 rna e 0 len ers are pnmary caregIvers. 
Of federal inmates surveyed, ninety-one percent of men indicated that 
their child lives with the child's mother, while only thirty-three percent of 
women indicated their child's father was caring for their child. I74 The same 
trend emerged in a state prison survey, where ninety percent of men 
indicated their wives were taking care of their children, while only twenty-
two percent of women indicated their husbands were taking care of their 
children. 175 Furthermore, the children of Mrican American and Latina 
women are more prone to being harmed by this system, because single 
parenthood is more prevalent in these groups than in white women. 176 
There are also other ways in which women bear a disparate impact of 
harsher treatment from a sentencing system that ignores children. First, 
women are more likely to lose their parental rights when incarcerated 
because they are much more likely to be primary-caregiving single 
parents. I77 Further, most fathers do not make themselves available to take 
care of the child while the mother is incarcerated. As one scholar pointed 
out, the loss of parental rights acts as a double punishment for these 
women's crimes. 178 
Second, female offenders are more likely to be placed further away 
from their family, because there are fewer federal prisons for women. I79 
Out of sixty-eight federal prisons in the country, only fourteen have female 
inmates. 180 Third, the gendered nature of crime also affects the disparate 
impact on women. Much more frequently than men, female offenders are 
convicted of crimes where they participated along with their spouse or 
companion. Many of these female offenders are involved with men who 
173. See King, supra note 146, at 296. (80% of female offenders are single parents, and 
only 9% of male offenders are single parents.). 
174. See id. at 952 (citing FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND 
EVALUATION Table 2 (1993». 
175. See LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD & STEPHANIE MINOR-HARPER, WOMEN IN PRISON, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REP. 6-7 (1991). 
176. See id. at 950 (Table F, at 9). 
177. See id. at 7. The state prison survey indicated that 28% of the female inmates lost 
their parental rights as a result of incarceration. 
178. See Adela Beckerman, Women in Prison: The Conflict Between Confinement and 
Parental Rights, 18 Soc. JUST. 171,180 (1991). 
179. See John C. Coughenour et al., The Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts; The 
Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 745, 922 
(1994). 
180. See id. 
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"are described as being central to the conspiracies in question.,,181 While 
the women usually play relatively marginal roles in the commission of the 
crime, they are often charged with the same offenses.182 It is suggested by 
some authors that the overall increased criminality of women is a result of 
this participation with their husbands or boyfriends. 183 
Some critics argue that the consideration of the presence of dependent 
children and allowing for lenient treatment of mothers will "unintentionally 
reinforce gender stereotypes.,,184 Nagel and Johnson argue that this will 
send the message that it is acceptable for mothers to break the law, because 
the courts will grant them leniency to let them take care of their children. 185 
However, the overall effects from not considering the presence of 
children are manifested in both the harm to the children of offenders in 
general, and an increased probability of harm to the children of female 
offenders. Gender-neutral policies like the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
ignore these realities. Consideration of the presence of children is 
warranted and some scholars go so far as to argue for a woman-normed 
approach to policy making. 186 That is, imagining the female offender as the 
lawbreaker when creating sentencing guidelines and then applying this to 
male offenders. This may be a good step in the direction of creating just 
punishment for every individual, considering that courts seem to scrutinize 
female defendants more closely than male defendants.187 
III. CONCLUSION 
Some critics may argue that criminal mothers are just as culpable as 
fathers and should therefore be punished equally. Furthermore, they may 
wonder what will deter single mothers if we do not incarcerate them. 
Perhaps fines would be sufficient; but this large group of single 
mothers in the criminal justice system tend to be from the poorest sector of 
society. Probation may be another possibility, and this may be sufficient 
punishment considering that women are less prone to be recidivists than 
men. 
However, these issues do not address the reasons why many of these 
women commit crimes. It is an ineffectual argument to say that it is not the 
job of the criminal justice system to address societal factors that affect the 
offender's decision to commit a crime. While it may be imprudent to over-
181. Raeder, supra note 12, at 977. 
182. See id. at 978. 
183. See id. 
184. Nagel and Johnson, supra note 10, at 208. 
185. See id. at 208. 
186. See DALY, GENDER, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 3, at 269. 
187. See Lorraine Schmall, Forgiving Guin Garcia: Women, the Death Penalty and 
Commutation, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 283,288 (1996) (Schmall argues that courts pay more 
attention to female offender's stories and the contexts of their criminal behavior, and that 
this should also be applied to men.). 
-,! e 
Summer 1999] PROTECTING CHILDREN 407 
generalize, most female offenders are far below the poverty line, commit 
non-violent crimes-including many drug-related offenses involving male 
partners. How can the penal system effectively deter crimes if policy 
makers do not address the poverty and gendered role of women's crimes? 
Looking to causes will force us to see the gendered role of crime, 
institutional racism and poverty. This will force us to realize that our 
society is not providing even a minimal basis of living for a huge segment 
of this country's population.188 This should open the eyes of policy makers 
to the fact that crime is necessarily tied to other social factors, and must be 
dealt with within that framework. "Addressing ourselves more to the 
human needs of the people who become involved in criminal activity might 
evolve more productive policies than those policies which emphasize 
police hardware and tougher prison security.,,189 
Unfortunately, policy makers and politicians today would rather close 
their eyes to both the sources of problems and the long-term solutions, and 
instead lock up single mothers under mandatory sentencing laws. The 
ultimate price of this sentencing structure is the cost to their innocent 
children. What policy makers fail to see is that when children pay the 
price, so does society as a whole. These children do not simply disappear; 
they often end up in the same system as their parents. Lock-up is not the 
long-term answer. Children should not pay for politicians' short-term 
aspirations and political goals. 
188. See generally WILSON, supra note 113 (pointing to the disappearing jobs, especially 
in the inner cities in the United States, and how this is directly linked with poverty and 
crime). 
189. Raeder, supra note 12, at 930 (citing MOULDS, supra note 13). 
